The United States ability to remain a dominant global power relies on its capability to deploy, sustain, and redeploy its military forces. The increasing effects from globalization have challenged the U.S. strategy to maintain domestic security and international order. With the increased competition to access the global lines of communications, the U.S. may no longer enjoy the freedom to unilaterally deploy forces around the world. The challenge to the Joint force is the process of introducing a force into a theater of operations. The United States inability to respond to a short notice crisis could hinder the Combatant Commander's ability to effectively use military force to meet U.S. national ends. To mitigate this challenge, the DoD must develop an integrated strategic mobility strategy to extend the reach of U.S. forces from the port of embarkation into the theater interior lines of communication. Supporting National Security Strategy
Expeditionary Theater Opening Strategy
The 2010 National Military Strategy (NSS) highlighted a rising concern from the U.S. national leadership on the increasing effects of globalization on the United States interests to maintain domestic security and international order. The NSS advocates a whole-of-government approach to create an environment that promotes U.S. interests.
The complex global environment has created some urgency to unify efforts throughout the U.S. diplomatic, economic, information, and military elements of power. U.S. financial institutions and other economic instruments are essential components of the nation's prosperity and international influence. Maintaining a resilient economy depends considerably on our ability to sell U.S. exports to overseas markets, and retain access to worldwide resources and scarce commodities. 3 Any threat to deny U.S.
access to the global economy is a direct threat to the American way of life. For the military, the Department of Defense (DoD) has been assigned a supporting role to strengthen the nation's economic and diplomatic efforts to preserve U.S. international influence. The NSS tasked the DoD to maintain a superior conventional force that is capable of securing U.S. access to the international global commons. To accomplish this mission, the U.S. force must maintain superiority across the military domains and remain agile enough to defeat any conventional or asymmetric threats that threaten U.S. access to international trade routes. 4 To counter an adversary's efforts to restrict U.S. freedom of access, the U.S.
military must be able to deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments: 5 Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16) stated that the current mobility force structure 6 meets the demands of two near-simultaneous conventional contingencies. 10 It appears the latest mobility study is based on principles of a former era gone by. The nation's leaders seemed resigned to a status-quo mobility strategy: maintain the strategic airlift fleet at current levels, recapitalize the airlift, sealift and prepositioned assets that concentrate all efforts on the current fight in Afghanistan. As the SPM, SDDC is responsible for the seaport interface that connects into the theater distribution plan. 17 The regional SDDC elements work closely with the regional Combatant Command (CCMD) to provide management of all seaport operations to include the coordination of workload requirements, port security and port support activities.
Prepositioning
The DoD prepositioning program has played a critical role in supporting our force in recent operations. As the military continues to drawdown its forces in Europe and reduce troop strength in Afghanistan, redefining the role of forward positioning of material will grow in importance. As the United States rebalances its strategy to focus on the Asian Pacific region and continue to stabilize the Middle East, prepositioned materiel and equipment will continue to play a critical role in achieving success in future operations and shaping U.S. overall defense strategy. USTRANSCOM, under the guidelines and authorities as the process owner for all governmental and DoD transportation, has the responsibility to oversee the overall DoD-wide effectiveness, efficiencies and alignment of force projections operations. 26 As the functional command, USTRANSCOM has developed a Joint capability to close the many rapid port opening gaps.
The Expeditionary Theater Opening (ETO) concept formed the Joint Task Force
Port Opening (JTF-PO) designed to provide the Geographic CCDRs a rapidly deployable force, flexible in employment throughout a full spectrum of military activities.
The Jointly trained, air and sea port command and control elements effectively addresses many of the issues that hinder regional CCMD and Joint force headquarters ability to manage the flow of forces being introduced into a theater of operation. The JTF-PO concept was to eliminate the following capability gaps in rapidly opening a port of debarkation. 2. Limited ability to establish a theater distribution network.
3. Limited capability to provide movement control at the POD.
4. Inability to coordinate onward movement from the POD. the brigade must be tailored with augmented forces capable of performing a specific technical logistics function. 36 The SB lacks the staff expertise, critical functional support capabilities and enabling equipment that allow the brigade to perform various missions.
Although the Army has adopted a force structure that can adapt as the missions change, a baseline theater level SB lacks the enablers required for ETO and theater inland distribution operations.
Conclusion
The assumption that the United States will operate inside a Regional CCDR's
Theater of Operation with established reception and distribution capability is false. The U.S. national security outlook for the U.S. is in constant change. The future environment will require the nation to address the challenges of emerging peer competitors, non-state actors, and other disruptive or catastrophic events that require some use of military force. Responding to emerging international and transnational threats requires a constant alignment of new intercontinental partnerships, coalitions, and alliances. 37 The nation's ability to respond in a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment requires a defense strategy that maintains a qualitative edge on projecting its military power.
The active pursuit of promoting peace and stability throughout the world is a prerequisite for meeting the NSS goals. U.S. influence abroad has been imposed by U.S. unilateral military action, or U.S. led coalition military presence in locations where the national interests has been challenged. During the past decade, the DoD deployed on average, more than 190,000 service members annually to over-seas contingency operations in order to achieve its national goals. 38 At the same time, the U.S. Army underwent the largest and most rapid transformation of its forces in the nation's history.
The U.S. Army's goal was to transform into a lighter, more lethal force capable of meeting the demands of full spectrum operations. 39 As the military has shown its ability to adapt to the current fight, it is time for the Joint force to shape itself for the next challenge.
Although the Goldwater -Nichols Act of 1986 initiated greater cooperation among the services, organizational and cultural differences have hindered the Joint force from achieving a collective strategy on projecting national military power. The U.S. Army has steadfastly retained its Cold War doctrine, organizational design, and culture. The
Army's focus on building Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) along with the reduction or elimination of the enabling logistics forces has inadvertently made them less mobile and more dependent on other Departments to achieve strategic reach. The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy's platform centric Air-Sea Battle (ASB) strategy has kept the two services strategically aligned. However, ASB fails to incorporate the significance of the land power domain. 40 To operate effectively, the Joint force of tomorrow needs enhanced and integrated capabilities across all operational domains. 41 The Joint Force must be able to maintain -at a minimum -local or temporary air and maritime superiority over the global commons. It must be able to reach into the operational area with enough capability to conduct virtually any expeditionary operation. 
Recommendations
The DoD's incessant examination of the ways and means our forces project power continues to address a critical problem. Maintaining its unrivaled global reach will ensure that the U.S. remains a dominant global power. Now and into the future, the requirement to project our national military power will rely more on lifting forces and equipment from the Continental United States and less on forward operating bases. In order to provide the timely movement of deploying forces, the Joint force must close the gaps in command and control, rapid port opening, and force structure that continue to hinder the introduction of forces into a theater of operation.
First, the DOD should acknowledge the tension between USTRANSCOM and the supported regional CCMD. Both CCDRs have explicit responsibilities for the deployment and distribution design. The USTRANSCOM has executive responsibilities to advance the operational approach for deployment operations. USTRANSCOM will provide the strategy air, sea, and port opening capability for the movement to theater.
The supported Regional CCDR has to effectively C2 the theater hand off from the strategic movement to the interior lines. Realigning responsibilities between the supported and supporting CCDRs will assist in alleviating the ineffective C2 of Theater opening operations.
First, assign the CCDR's JDDOC to USTRANSCOM. The CCDR with the authority, direction, and control over national mobility forces, lacks sufficient influence on transportation and mobility operations within the interior theater lines of communication. Aligning the command authority of the JDDOC to USTRANSCOM, will establish a direct link from the regional CCDR command information technology (IT) system connection to the national ITV systems. 42 A consistently trained and resourced JDDOC, with a direct support role to the regional CCDR, will unify the transportation and mobility operations across multiple joint operating environments, theaters of war, or theaters of operation.
Second, the DoD's Global Employment of Forces (GEF) should assign Expeditionary Theater Opening (ETO), port opening responsibilities to the regional CCDR. National level JTP-PO forces are currently assigned under USTRANSCOM; they are CONUS based. As we reduce our overseas presence, there will be increased demand the nation's strategic mobility assets. Placing JTF-PO forces in the TPFDD ahead of combat forces is a waste of strategic lift capacity and of precious time. The majority of military operations over the last decade have been short to no-notice crisis actions. The regional CCDR is better placed to respond to the multiple demands of ETO. With assigned intra-theater assets, a regional CCDR could respond to a regional crisis inside the theater within hours -not days -of notification. Present organizational design of the TSC and ESC requires augmentation from other U.S. Army elements in order to provide that capability. 44 The U.S. competitive advantage over all other international powers has been grounded in part from our military's ability to project and sustain its forces globally. As the DoD reduces its presence in Afghanistan, and rebalances forces to other parts of the world, the military must strengthen its expeditionary capability. To achieve this, the Joint force must keep its promise to our regional CCDR's and civil leaders to provide a rapidly deployable force capable of protecting the nation's security and interests.
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